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Atlantic Richfield Company v. Christian, 140 S. Ct. 1335 (2020)
Jo J. Phippin
In 1983, the EPA designated roughly 300 miles of polluted mining
land near Butte, Montana, as a Superfund site, which the EPA now
manages. In 2008, landowners adjacent to the Superfund site brought state
law claims against Atlantic Richfield, the company that owned the smelter
site. In March 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that
Montana state courts have jurisdiction over the landowners’ suit, and that
the landowners on this Superfund site qualify as potentially responsible
parties.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Atlantic Richfield Company v. Christian,1 the plaintiffs
(“landowners”) sought restoration damages from the company that owned
the smelter site, the Atlantic Richfield Company (“Atlantic Richfield”),
for trespass, nuisance, and strict liability under Montana state law. Atlantic
Richfield asserted that Montana state courts lacked jurisdiction over the
landowners’ claims, and that the landowners were potentially responsible
parties. The Supreme Court of the United States (“the Supreme Court” or
“the Court”) considered two issues. First, whether the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”)
strips Montana state courts of jurisdiction over a suit for restoration
damages on a Superfund site.2 Second, the Court considered whether the
landowners qualify as potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) under
CERCLA, thereby requiring them to receive approval from the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) before initiating individual
remedial efforts on their properties.3 The landowners argued that Montana
state courts possessed jurisdiction, and that they did not qualify as PRPs;
Atlantic Richfield argued the opposite.4 The Supreme Court held that
CERCLA does not strip Montana state courts of jurisdiction over this suit.5
Additionally, the Court held that the landowners qualify as PRPs.6
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1902, an abundance of copper catalyzed a prosperous mining
industry in Butte, Montana.7 Subsequently, the Anaconda Copper Mining
Company constructed three smelters to refine copper in the nearby town
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of Anaconda.8 In the 1970s, the price of copper began dropping
prompting Atlantic Richfield to purchase the Anaconda Company;
however, by 1980 Atlantic Richfield shut down the smelters because the
copper’s value plummeted.9 Also in 1980, Congress passed CERCLA,
which made Atlantic Richfield liable for the tons of arsenic and lead that
the smelters emitted during the previous century across the Deer Lodge
Valley.10 The EPA declared over 300 square miles surrounding the
smelters as a Superfund site.11 Accordingly, the EPA created a cleanup
plan and still works with Atlantic Richfield to carry out those remedial
efforts.12
In 2008, ninety-eight landowners with property contaminated by
the Superfund site brought a suit against Atlantic Richfield in Montana
state court, claiming trespass, nuisance, and strict liability for restoration
damages.13 The landowners sought to use the damages to implement their
own remedial efforts on their respective properties.14 However, the
landowners’ desired plan exceeded the ceiling set by the EPA as
“protective of human health and the environment.”15 For instance, while
the EPA’s plan called for the maximum soil contamination level to be no
higher than 250 parts per million of arsenic, the landowners want to
reduce that number to 15 parts per million of arsenic.16
In the district court, the landowners and Atlantic Richfield filed
competing motions for summary judgment on whether CERCLA
precluded the claim for restoration damages brought by the landowners.17
Atlantic Richfield argued that CERCLA, via Section 113(h), preempted
the landowners’ claim by stripping Montana state courts jurisdiction.18
The district court did not address the preemption issue; it dismissed the
landowners’ case based on Atlantic Richfield’s argument that the statute
of limitations barred their claims.19
The landowners appealed, and the Montana Supreme Court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case back to the
district court.20 On remand, the district court denied Atlantic Richfield’s
motions for summary judgment.21 Subsequently, Atlantic Richfield
petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory
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control.22 The Montana Supreme Court granted the writ and held that
Montana courts possessed jurisdiction over the landowners’ claim for
restoration damages, and that the landowners did not qualify as PRPs.23
Then, Atlantic Richfield filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the
Supreme Court granted.24
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court ruled on two issues concerning jurisdiction
in this case.25 First, the Court considered whether it possessed
jurisdiction to review the Montana Supreme Court’s decision.26 Second,
the Court considered whether Montana state courts possessed jurisdiction
over the landowners’ claim for restoration damages.27 Then, the Court
determined whether it considers the landowners as PRPs.
A. Jurisdiction
The Court held that it possessed jurisdiction to review the
Montana Supreme Court’s decision.28 The Court stated it had jurisdiction
to review “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a
State.”29 The Court dismissed the landowners’ argument that the
Montana Supreme Court’s judgment was not fully decided because the
Court remanded to the lower court for trial.30 The Court reasoned that
because the Montana Supreme Court heard the case based on a writ of
supervisory control, it was not an interlocutory or intermediate
litigation.31 Rather, the Court stated the writ of supervisory control
constituted a “self-contained” or “separate” lawsuit that resulted in a
final judgment.32
Next, the Court affirmed that Montana courts had jurisdiction
over the landowners’ suit for restoration damages.33 Atlantic Richfield
argued that Section 113(h) of CERCLA expands the type of actions that
are precluded from state court jurisdiction under Section 113(b) of
CERCLA.34 Section 113(b) strips state courts of jurisdiction over cases
“arising under” CERCLA, while Section 113(h) strips federal courts of
jurisdiction over some “challenges” to remedial actions on Superfund
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2020

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. V. CHRISTIAN

4

sites.35 The Court rejected Atlantic Richfield’s argument because a plain
reading of the text rendered it “insurmountable.”36 The Court stated that
Section 113(h) and 113(b) work independently of one another, and only
overlap when a suit meets three criteria: (1) it challenges a cleanup plan;
(2) it is brought in federal court; and (3) it arises under CERCLA. 37
Because the landowners claimed nuisance, trespass, and strict liability,
their suits arose under Montana law, not CERCLA, which governs
federal laws.38 Therefore, the Court held that Montana courts have
jurisdiction over this suit because it arose under state law claims.39
B. The Landowners Qualify as PRPs
Next, the Court discussed the landowners’ status as PRPs. As the
Court noted, determining whether a party is a PRP is important because
this status regulates whether a party needs EPA approval before
undertaking remedial efforts on private property.40 Section 122(e)(6) states
that “[w]hen either the President, or a potentially responsible party . . . has
initiated a remedial investigation and feasibility study for a particular
facility under this chapter, no potentially responsible party may undertake
any remedial action at the facility unless such remedial action has been
authorized by the President.”41 Both Atlantic Richfield and the landowners
agree that this section requires any PRP to get approval from the EPA
before taking remedial action.42 In order to determine if the landowners
are PRPs, the Court looked to the list of “covered persons” in Section 107
of CERCLA.43 Section 107(a) states that any “owner” of “a facility” is a
PRP, and that a facility is “any site or area where a hazardous substance
has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to
be located.”44 Therefore, the Court held that the landowners are PRPs
because arsenic and lead are hazardous substances and are located on their
properties.45
The landowners put forth two arguments denying PRP status that
the Court rejected. The landowners argued that they do not qualify as PRPs
because CERCLA’s “six-year limitations period for recovery of remedial
costs has run, and thus they could not be held liable in a hypothetical
lawsuit.”46 In addition, the landowners argued that they do not qualify as
PRPs “because they did not receive the notice of settlement negotiations
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Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b), (h)).
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Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B) (2018)).
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Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B) (2018)).
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required by Section 122(e)(1).”47 The Court rejected the landowners’ first
argument because a landowner can be a PRP even when that landowner
can no longer be sued.48 Additionally, the Court drew on the policy goals
behind CERCLA. The Court stated that PRPs include owners of
contaminated property, even “innocent landowner[s]” because
CERCLA’s goal, as its name suggests, is to develop a “Comprehensive
Environmental Response” to pollution.49 The Court pointed out that if the
landowners’ first argument prevailed, there would likely be tens of
thousands of competing cleanup plans headed by individual landowners
rather than one comprehensive plan managed by the EPA.50
Next, the Court rejected the landowners’ second argument. Under
Section 122(e)(1) of CERCLA, all PRPs must be notified of settlement
negotiations.51 The EPA has a nonenforcement policy, which provides that
the EPA does not seek recovery costs from landowners who did not cause
the contamination affecting their property, and who do not interfere with
the EPA’s cleanup efforts.52 Under this nonenforcement policy, the EPA
did not include the ninety-eight landowners in settlement negotiations;
thus, the landowners argued that they could not qualify for PRP status.53
The Court stated that although the EPA did not follow CERCLA’s
mandate when it failed to provide the landowners with notice of settlement
negotiations, the landowners are nevertheless considered PRPs.54
Alternatively, the landowners argued that if they do qualify as
PRPS, they qualify as contiguous property owners under Section 107(g)
and shed their PRP status.55 The Court rejected this “last ditch effort”
argument.56 The majority reasoned that eight requirements must be met for
a landowner to qualify as a contiguous property owner under CERCLA; a
“high bar” that not all ninety-eight individual landowners could clear.57 In
particular, the eighth requirement is that a person “did not know or have
reason to know that the property was or could be contaminated by a release
or threatened release of one or more hazardous substances.”58 The Court
stated that there was abundant evidence of public knowledge both arsenic
and lead contaminated.59 As an example of public knowledge, the Court
pointed out that all ninety-eight landowners purchased their respective

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
(2015)).

Id. at 1354 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(1) (2018)).
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Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(1)(A)(i)-(viii) (2018)).
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(1)(A)(viii)(II) (2018)).
Id. (citing Christian v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 368 P.3d 131, 155

2020

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. V. CHRISTIAN

6

properties after the Anaconda Company constructed “Washington
Monument sized smelter”.60
Also, the Court again drew on CERCLA’s underlying policy
goals; even if the individual landowners met all eight requirements,
CERCLA demands that contiguous landowners provide “full cooperation,
assistance, and access” to the EPA’s Superfund cleanup efforts.61 The
Federal Government’s interpretation of the landowners’ proposed plan for
remedial action demonstrates that individual efforts conflict and interfere
with the EPA’s efforts.62 Thus, the landowners would lose their status as
contiguous owners regardless.63 Overall, the Court held that the
landowners need EPA approval before taking remedial action because they
are PRPs under CERCLA; thus, the Court held that the Montana Supreme
Court erred in this part of their holding.64
IV. CONCLUSION
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian highlights a rift created by
CERCLA. The benefits of a comprehensive environmental cleanup of
hazardous pollutants result in obstacles for property owners on Superfund
sites who wish to take individual remedial efforts.65 In the dissent, Justice
Gorsuch contends that the Court’s interpretation of CERCLA, whereby
landowners must receive EPA approval before taking remedial action on
private property, is “paternalistic central planning,” and “turns a cold
shoulder to ‘state law efforts to restore state lands.’”66 Alternatively, the
majority describes this as the “spirit of cooperative federalism [that] run[s]
throughout CERCLA and its regulations.”67 Perhaps to account for this
rift, the Court urged that if the landowners pursued approval from the EPA
for their plan, the clash between the EPA and the landowners could be
resolved “as Congress envisioned.”68
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